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Three days before Super Bowl III, Joe Namath, "with a double scotch in his
hand,"' guaranteed that the New York Jets would beat the Baltimore Colts. The
Jets were eighteen point underdogs, but Namath predicted, "we'll win, I guarantee
it."'2 In 1969, some thought that Namath was a brash, loud-mouthed quarterback,
and his victory boast provoked scorn and laughter. But Namath and the Jets
backed up Broadway Joe's guarantee and many believe that Super Bowl III was
"one of the most important games in the history of the National Football League." 3
Four years before Broadway Joe and the Jets whipped the Colts in Super
Bowl III, Yale Kamisar may have accomplished the academic equivalent of Joe
Namath's "guarantee," albeit with less fanfare than Namath's boast. In the fall of
1965, the justices of the United States Supreme Court had resolved to "finally deal
with [a] criminal justice problem that had haunted the . . .Court for decades-
confessions." 4 On November 22, the Court agreed to review Miranda v. Arizona5
together with three other cases.6 Miranda7 and its companion cases went on to
become one of the most important and famous rulings in the Court's history. 8 But
before the confessions cases were decided, Kamisar wrote a ninety-five page
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Robert Lipsyte, Sports of the Times, Broadway Joe Is No.], N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1969, at
33.
2 Id.
3 Scott Adamson, The Bowl that Made It Super, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV., Jan. 27, 2004
(explaining that Super Bowl III was "one of the most important games in the history of the National
Football League[,]" because it precipitated the merger between the American and National Football
Leagues), available at LEXIS, News Library, SCHWRD File.
4 FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 154 (1970).
5 382 U.S. 925 (1965).
6 California v. Stewart, 382 U.S. 937 (1965); Vignera v. New York, 382 U.S. 925 (1965);
Westover v. United States, 382 U.S. 924 (1965).
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8 See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES-200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW vii (1976)
(listing Miranda as the fourth most important event in American legal history). The public's initial
response to Miranda was mostly negative. Indeed, many in the legal profession criticized the ruling.
A few months after Miranda was decided, Kamisar observed that the ruling "has evoked much anger
and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors." Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966).
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article that provided the intellectual foundation for Miranda.9 Like Broadway Joe
when he guaranteed a win for the Jets in Super Bowl III, Kamisar accurately
"predicted" what the Court would do in the confessions cases.
While many feared that the Court was poised to ban all police custodial
interrogation,' 0 Kamisar advised, "I would not abolish all in-custody police
interrogation."" A few months later, the Miranda Court stated, "we do not purport
to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law
enforcement."' 12 Kamisar explained, however, that he "would bar ... the all too
prevalent in-custody interrogation which takes place under conditions undermining
a suspect's freedom to speak or not to speak-and the all too prevalent questioning
of those who are unaware and uninformed of their rights."' 3 The Court agreed with
Kamisar and ruled that the confessions in Miranda and its companion cases were
inadmissible at trial because they "share[d] salient features-incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights."'
14
Kamisar also maintained that the Constitution did not impose a duty on police
officials to prevent a suspect from incriminating himself. He did, however,
contend that the state "must ensure that the suspect is aware that he need not, and
9 Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to .... in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1-95
(A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). A reliable source informs me that the original title of this article used
the phrase "Equal Justice in the Outhouses and Penthouses of American Criminal Procedure," but
Kamisar changed the title when Professor Arthur E. Sutherland told him that title was too inelegant.
As soon as Sutherland suggested the "Gatehouses and Mansions" metaphor, Kamisar knew that was a
more appropriate title. The "Gatehouses and Mansions" was a better metaphor than the "Outhouses
and Penthouses" because you had to go through the gatehouse to get to the mansion, just as a criminal
suspect has to go through the stationhouse before he gets to the courtroom, where he has greater legal
protection. At the same time that Kamisar was composing the Gatehouses and Mansions article,
Professor Sutherland was also working on an article about police interrogation methods. See Arthur
E. Sutherland, Crime and Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 21 (1965). Professor Sutherland's article
was also cited by the Miranda Court. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 n.26.
1o See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 61-62 (noting that after the Court had heard arguments
in Miranda and its companion cases, three of the nation's most respected state court jurists "spoke
publicly in anticipation of [Miranda], asking the Court to stay its hand"). These judges were worried
that the Court would impose rules that would severely hamstring police interrogation methods. Id.;
see also Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective,
31 TULSA L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (noting that Judges Charles Breitel, Henry Friendly, Walter Schaefer and
Roger Traynor spoke at public lectures on the eve of Miranda and "urged the Court to turn back or at
least to reconsider where it was going") (footnote omitted).
11 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 10 (acknowledging that interrogation "leads to the precharge
release of many lawfully arrested persons and to reduced charges in other cases," and that "although
[confessions] are too often the product of compulsion-more often than defendants can prove-
damaging statements are also the product of conscience, remorse, even calculation").
12 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
13 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 10.
14 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
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cannot be made to, incriminate himself.' 5  He also asserted that "so far as it is
reasonably possible[,] the state can and should ensure that the choice of the weak
and the ignorant and the poor to speak or not to speak is as free and as informed as
that of their more fortunately endowed brethren."'16 Finally, Kamisar noted that
because "important consequences flow from a suspect's request for counsel, all
suspects should be made aware that they may make such a request.' 
' 7
Miranda embraced each of these positions. Because "[t]he privilege against
self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals,"'18 every
arrestee subject to custodial interrogation must be informed of his right to remain
silent and told that anything he says to the police can be used against him at trial. 19
Moreover, every arrestee, whether rich or poor, must be informed of his right to
counsel, including that if he cannot afford counsel, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him before and during interrogation. 20 For, as the Court recognized, "the
warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would
convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the
knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present."
2 1
Yale Kamisar's extraordinary contributions and impact on modem American
constitutional criminal procedure are unequalled. He has written and lectured
cogently about the Fourth and the Sixth Amendments.22 He may be best known,
15 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 10.
16 Id.
17 Id. at ll.
18 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472.
'9 Id. at 467-68.
20 Id. at 473.
21 Id. (footnote omitted).
22 Kamisar's law review articles, book chapters and legal essays on constitutional criminal
procedure are too numerous to cite in this forum. Although not as well known as his Fifth
Amendment articles, Kamisar's articles on the Fourth Amendment are extremely thoughtful and
informative. For example, I learned many things about the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and the history of the exclusionary rule by reading the following: Yale Kamisar, "Comparative
Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987); Yale
Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis " Rather than an
"Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); Yale Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten
Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (1959).
When I first began teaching criminal procedure, Kamisar's article on probable cause was particularly
helpful in structuring my classroom notes and teaching me about the Court's approach to probable
cause. See Yale Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause, " "Good Faith, " and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV.
551 (1984). Before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was decided, Kamisar wrote several
informative and influential articles on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel clause. See Yale
Kamisar, Betts v. Brady, Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61
MICH. L. REV. 219 (1962); Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Dialogue on the Most Pervasive Right of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962). The latter article
was cited by the Court in Gideon. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338 n.2. His articles on Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the "Christian Burial Speech" case are classics. See Yale Kamisar,
Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation "? When Does it Matter?, 67
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however, for his scholarship on the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination generally, and his writings about police interrogation methods
specifically. Indeed, his scholarship on Miranda v. Arizona has influenced (and
provoked) two generations of Supreme Court justices, lower court judges, and
hundreds, if not thousands, of academic scholars and law enforcement officials.23
Kamisar's writings on police interrogations, confessions, and constitutional
law are legendary. Rather than consider the breadth and scope of Kamisar's
scholarship, which spans over forty years and continues today, 4 I will examine a
single essay written by Kamisar during the salad days of his thinking about police
interrogations. Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
Criminal Procedure: From Powell To Gideon, From Escobedo To . . . is an
extraordinary article, which provides the groundwork for Kamisar's "prediction"
about what the Court would do in Miranda. One of three essays published in a
1965 book edited by A.E. Dick Howard, entitled Criminal Justice in Our Time,
Gatehouses and Mansions was not Kamisar's first venture into the then and still
controversial topic of police interrogation and the Constitution. Kamisar began
writing Gatehouses and Mansions one year after he had published an article on the
GEO. L.J. 1 (1978) [hereinafter When Does It Matter?]; Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v.
Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977) [hereinafter A Hard
Look]. Of course, Kamisar is a co-author of the most widely used casebook on constitutional
criminal procedure. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES-
COMMENTS--QUESTIONS (10th ed. 2002) [hereinafter MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. He is also a
co-author of a popular casebook on constitutional law. See JESSIE H. CHOPER ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 2001).
23 Professor Stephen Schulhofer has described Kamisar as "a leading force in the Miranda
'revolution' of the 1960s." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865,
866 (1981). In 1970, when the curtain had fallen on the Warren Court and its due process revolution,
Fred Graham described Kamisar as "one of the scrappiest combatants on the liberal side" of the due
process revolution. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 286. While the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
quelled the Miranda revolution specifically and the Warren Court's due process revolution generally,
Kamisar remains a prolific and respected scholar in the seemingly never-ending debate over the
proper balance between individual liberties and law enforcement.
24 Although sometimes great athletes are said to have "lost a step" as they get older, time has
not affected the quality or productivity of Kamisar's scholarship. He is still "mixing it up" with the
Court and individual justices, see, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to §3501 to
Dickerson to. . . , 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001); Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A
Close Look at the Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 401-25
(2001) [hereinafter Thirty-Five Years Later] (critiquing Justice Scalia's dissent in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)), and other scholars and judges, see, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The
Calabresi-Kamisar Debate on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 119 (2003); Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
883 (2000) (critiquing arguments that Congress could overrule Miranda by statute); Yale Kamisar,
On the "Fruits " of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 936 (1995); Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 537 (1990) [hereinafter Remembering the "Old
World"].
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meaning of involuntary confessions. In 1965, Kamisar may have "had no
intention of starting on another piece about the subject [of police interrogations and
the Constitution] so soon,, 26 but thankfully, he changed his mind. Gatehouses and
Mansions is a tour deforce.
Gatehouses and Mansions was written during an exciting and uncertain era in
the development of constitutional criminal procedure. For many years, the Court
had analyzed the constitutional validity of police interrogation methods on a case-
by-case basis. Starting in the 1930s and continuing through the early 1960s, the
Court avoided broad edicts and bright-line rules about the limits of police
interrogation tactics. To be sure, the Court ruled in favor of many defendants who
had challenged the constitutionality of their police interrogation practices during
this thirty-year period. Nonetheless, although the Court led by Chief Justice Earl
Warren seemed less tolerant of police interrogation methods than its predecessor,
as late as 1963 it had imposed no significant obstacle in the path of police officers
27interrogating arrestees.
In 1964, however, things changed dramatically. First came Massiah v. United
States. 8 In Massiah, the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
barred the government from using at trial incriminating statements that federal
agents had deliberately (and surreptitiously) elicited from a defendant after he had
been indicted and in the absence of counsel.29
Then, one month later, came Escobedo v. Illinois.30 Escobedo, like Massiah,
relied on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. But its holding and meaning were
not-and never have been--clear. 31 The only thing certain about Escobedo was
25 Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and
Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963).
26 YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS xi (1980) [hereinafter POLICE
INTERROGATION].
27 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). The Haynes Court did not require
that police warn suspects of their right to remain silent or right to consult with counsel, or even that
officers refrain from questioning when a suspect indicates an unwillingness to speak with police.
Rather, the Court only ruled that Haynes' confession was involuntary under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because Haynes had been subjected to continuous questioning and was
not permitted to call his wife until he agreed to cooperate with the police and make a written
statement admitting his participation in a robbery.
28 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
29 Id. at 206.
30 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In the interim between Massiah and Escobedo, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964), was decided. Malloy held that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause was
applicable to the States. As Professor Lawrence Herman aptly described it at the time, Malloy
conducted "what might have seemed to some a shotgun wedding of the privilege [against self-
incrimination] to the confessions rule" of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J.
449, 465 (1964).
31 See Kamisar, supra note 9, at 53 ("In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court ... struck down
Escobedo's confession. At this juncture that is about all one can say about the case without getting
into an argument.").
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the Court's conclusion that Escobedo's confession, taken during a police
interrogation while he was under arrest and after he had requested and been denied
access to his lawyer, was inadmissible at his trial.
Massiah and Escobedo together generated enormous uncertainty as to the
permissible methods law enforcement officers could undertake when interrogating
a person suspected of criminal activity. In particular, Escobedo raised several
questions, including "who" was protected by its holding, "when" the right to
counsel was triggered, and "what" the scope of the right to counsel was. In
Gatehouses and Mansions, Kamisar modestly described his goal as "to dwell on
one piece of unfinished right-to-counsel business-the stage at which the state
must first provide an indigent person with a lawyer." 32 Although Kamisar begins
his essay in modest fashion, it is anything but unassuming. Kamisar provides the
reader with a scholarly, yet pragmatic, analysis of the then-clandestine world of
police interrogation. The reader is given a detailed discussion of legal history,
Supreme Court rulings, and lawyerly arguments about the pros and cons of police
interrogation methods. Kamisar forces the reader to reconcile the practice of
coercing confessions with the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. After contrasting the many constitutional protections afforded the
accused at trial (the "mansion") with the meager protections existing in the
interrogation room (the "gatehouse"), Kamisar commented:
True, the man in the street would have considerable difficulty
explaining why the Constitution requires so much in the courtroom and
means so little in the police station, but that is not his affair. "The task of
keeping the two shows going at the same time without losing the
patronage or the support of the Constitution for either," as Thurman
Arnold once observed, is "left to the legal scholar." Perhaps this is only
fitting and proper, for as Thomas Reed Powell used to say, if you can
think about something that is related to something else without thinking
about the thing to which it is related, then you have the legal mind.33
Kamisar's writing is forthright,34 his use of imagery brilliant, and his
arguments are forceful and compelling.35 In short, Kamisar's essay "addresses the
32 Id. at 9.
33 Id. at 21 (footnotes and citations omitted).
34 See, e.g., id. at 13:
For amid all the sound and fury one point is plain: in the absence of judge and jury,
law enforcement officers [during interrogation sessions] can-and without hesitation
do-resort to methods they would never consider utilizing at the trial; the case for the
prosecution is stronger-much stronger-if what was done to the defendant was done
away from the restraining influence of a public trial in an open courtroom .... The
police and the prosecutors (and evidently the public) like it this way. They insist that
they need it this way. Some people-perhaps a majority of the present Supreme Court-
do not agree. This, in a word, is what the shouting is all about.
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fundamentals [of police confession and the Constitution] directly and with a
breadth of vision matched by few articles in the field.,
36
My article is divided into two sections. As Kamisar explained, Escobedo was
a ruling that could be read broadly or narrowly. Kamisar spent several pages
explaining how Escobedo should be read. Part I discusses Kamisar's analysis of
Escobedo. It also considers whether Kamisar accurately predicted how the Court
would interpret Escobedo and how the Court would resolve the questions left open
in Escobedo. Part II discusses whether the Miranda Court went far enough in the
protections it afforded arrestees subjected to police interrogation. When Miranda
was decided, the ruling was widely seen as defeat for law enforcement and a
windfall for criminals. But this view of Miranda was not universal. Part II of my
article considers two topics raised by Kamisar, but not addressed by the Court that
would have made Miranda a more protective decision for arrestees-a requirement
that interrogations be electronically recorded and a similar mandatory rule that an
arrestee be given access to counsel before being allowed to waive his right to
silence.
I. WHAT WOULD THE COURT Do IN THE CONFESSION CASES?
A. The Scope and Impact of Massiah and Escobedo
In 1964, when Escobedo was pending before the Court, an important shift in
the Court's thinking about police interrogation and confessions had occurred.
Prior to the 1960s, the constitutional validity of confessions was primarily
measured against the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under
the due process standard, the Court would decide whether a suspect's confession
was "voluntary." Until the mid-twentieth century, when a confession was found to
be "involuntary," and thus inadmissible at trial, it meant the Court believed the
confession was unreliable.37 Although the concept of "voluntariness" under the
Id.
35 Professor Schulhofer best captures Kamisar's writing style in a 1981 review essay of
Kamisar's book on confessions, which included a redacted version of the Gatehouses and Mansions
article:
[The article] survey[s] the pros and cons [of police interrogation and the Constitution] but
then let[s] you know where the author stands, usually in no uncertain terms, and often in
language that glows white hot with an indignation made more compelling by Kamisar's
obvious awareness of countervailing arguments and his graciousness (usually) to the
individuals who advance them.
Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 866.
36 Id. at 865 n.2; cf George C. Thomas III, An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 816 (1995) (book review) (noting that Kamisar's article "presents a legal
argument to ban police interrogation that is, at once, simple, and profound").
37 See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 22, at 440 ("At the outset ... the primary
(and perhaps the exclusive) basis for excluding confessions under the due process 'voluntariness' test
was the 'untrustworthiness' rationale, the view that the confession rule was designed merely to
2004]
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Due Process Clause expanded and evolved by the mid-point of the twentieth
century,38 the principal constitutional restraints on interrogation methods continued
to come from the Court's due process cases. 39 A change in the Court's thinking,
however, became evident in 1959. "Counting heads, it appeared that by 1959 a
majority of the Court was of the view that, once a person was formally charged, his
right to counsel had 'begun'-at least his right to the assistance of counsel he
himself had retained. That is to say, the absence of counsel under such
circumstances was alone sufficient to exclude any resulting confession.,
40
The subsequent result in Massiah seemed to solidify the notion that the right
to counsel (at least the right to retain counsel) provided an alternative basis for
measuring the constitutionality of a confession obtained via police interrogation.
As Kamisar explained:
[t]he crucial importance assigned to the absence of counsel [by the
Court] may be viewed as part of a more general trend, a shift to the
image of the accusatorial, adversary trial as the controlling standard of
protect the integrity of the fact-finding process."); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38
VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1430 (1985) (noting that under the due process rule, "the Court defined
voluntariness in a technical sense, at odds with common usage. In ordinary discourse, voluntariness
suggests free will, choice, even spontaneity. In the typical interrogation, however, there is some
coercion; the suspect is detained, queried, challenged, and contradicted. [Due process cases like
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944),]
employed the voluntariness concept as a shorthand for the conclusion that a confession had to be
obtained under circumstances that made it trustworthy."); see also Kamisar, supra note 25, at 742-43
("[Wihatever the current meaning of the elusive terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' confessions,
originally the terminology was a substitute for the 'trustworthiness' or 'reliability' test. For most of
the two hundred years within which this formulation had constituted 'the ultimate test,' it had been no
more than an alternative statement of the rule that a confession was admissible so long as it was free
of influences which made it 'unreliable' or 'probably untrue."') (footnote omitted).
38 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959):
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone
on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as
much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as
from the criminals themselves.
Id. at 320. Kamisar has described this evolution in another article: "As the voluntariness test
developed over the years, and it became increasingly clear that the Court was applying a 'police
methods' as well as a 'trustworthiness' rationale, the concern that an 'involuntary' or 'coerced'
confession was likely to be unreliable became less important." Remembering the "Old World",
supra note 24, at 543.
39 In federal prosecutions, the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule governed the admissibility of
confessions obtained in violation of a federal statutory requirement that a suspect be promptly taken
to a magistrate to determine whether there was probable cause to hold the suspect. See McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). For a discussion
of this rule, see MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 22, at 445-47.
40 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 42-43.
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the coerced confession cases. The novelty of this approach lay not in its
articulation... but its application.4'
In other words, the Court's concern that counsel was absent during police
interrogation became the basis for reversing convictions, rather than merely
existing as dicta to express the Court's disfavor toward questionable interrogation
methods.
This was the context in which Escobedo was decided. Danny Escobedo was
arrested for murder and brought to a police station for questioning. From one
perspective, this was an atypical case. "Escobedo, a trouble-prone, scrawny little
Chicago laborer, was a rare breed of criminal suspect-he was shrewd enough to
have a lawyer on call when the police pulled him in for questioning, and simple
enough to be tricked into confessing when his lawyer was not present to protect
him. '42  While being transported to the police station and during questioning,
Escobedo frequently asked to speak with his lawyer, but those requests were
denied. After Escobedo made an incriminating statement to the police, an assistant
state's attorney spoke with him and "ask[ed] carefully framed questions apparently
designed to assure the admissibility into evidence of the resulting answers."43 At
no time was Escobedo informed of his right to remain silent or given access to his
counsel, despite his repeated requests to talk with his lawyer and his attorney's
efforts to consult with his client.44
After the Illinois courts ruled that Escobedo's confession was admissible at
trial, the Court, in a split decision, ruled that the confession had been taken in
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In an opinion that has been
aptly described as "accordion-like, ' '4 Escobedo held that where:
[A police] investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and
the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied [his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel] ... and that no statement elicited by the police during
the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.46
" Id. at 46.
42 GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 164.
43 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 483.
44 While Escobedo was in custody, his attorney arrived at the police station. The attorney
repeatedly requested an opportunity to consult with his client, but those requests were denied. Id. at
480-81.
45 Remembering the "Old World", supra note 24, at 576 n. 138.
46 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
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Escobedo was (and remains) a controversial and much debated ruling.47
Although the Miranda opinion would soon "displace" the logic employed in
Escobedo,48 in 1964, the meaning, scope, and impact of Escobedo were uncertain.
As Kamisar observed, in certain places Justice Goldberg's opinion "meets the
arguments for an 'effective interrogation opportunity' so directly, and rejects them
so forcefully and fundamentally, that it promises (or threatens, depending upon
your viewpoint) to extinguish all police interrogation as we know it."49 In other
words, if Escobedo was read broadly, the Court was poised to deliver a knock-out
blow to police interrogation methods.
On the other hand, certain factual aspects of Escobedo allowed some courts to
read the ruling narrowly, permitting police interrogation methods to continue
without change. For example, Kamisar noted that some issues addressed by state
courts in the wake of Escobedo-for example, whether counsel was outside the
interrogation room trying to get in, or whether counsel had instructed the police to
cease questioning his client-should not have troubled judges.
How the rights conferred by Escobedo come into play and how they
operate-whether the right to counsel turns on a request, whether the
right is only available to the subject of police interrogation who has
retained or can retain his own lawyer, whether the right to remain silent
requires a warning to this effect-these are relatively easy questions.50
In the immediate aftermath of Escobedo, however, many state courts were
"muffing" the easy questions and not reaching the "hard questions" implicated by
the ruling.51
What were the "hard questions" raised by Escobedo's indeterminate holding?
Kamisar identified those issues with precision and insight:
47 See Caplan, supra note 37, at 1437 (asserting that Escobedo "marked a turning point in the
law of confessions"); id. at 1443 (arguing that Escobedo "was a significant step toward barring 'from
evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made
or not"') (quoting Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 495 (White, J., dissenting)). Shortly after Escobedo was
decided, the Court conceded that "th[e] case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and
spirited legal debate," "[b]oth state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at
varying conclusions," "[a] wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and
underpinnings," and "[plolice and prosecutors have speculated on its range and desirability."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440-41 (footnotes omitted).
48 Remembering the "'Old World", supra note 24, at 577 ("Miranda did not build on the
thinking in Escobedo as much as it displaced it. Although the Miranda Court moved in the same
general direction as Escobedo, it chose a different path.").
49 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 53.
50 Id. at 58.
51 Id.
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[W]hen do the rights conferred by Escobedo first come into play, and,
whenever they do (whomsoever they apply to), what is their scope and
duration? Does the right to counsel begin only in potentially coercive
situations? Only when conversation with a suspect shifts to
"aggressive" questioning? Or as soon as a suspect is "arrested"? Or
even earlier, when he is first "interviewed"? And whenever the right
begins, of what does it consist? The right to consult with counsel during
a brief break in the interrogation? The right not to be questioned until
counsel arrives? The right never to be questioned again in the absence of
counsel once he arrives?
52
Not only were these the "crucial questions" raised by Escobedo,53 these were
also the questions the Miranda Court would choose to resolve. But before the
Miranda Court addressed them, Kamisar offered some interesting (and somewhat
surprising) insights.
First, he noted that "[1]ogical radiations from Massiah and Escobedo carry
far," even to the point where "all police questioning in the absence of counsel is
barred., 54 Indeed, some of Escobedo's language suggested that the Court was on
the verge of reaching that conclusion, at least where retained counsel was not
present.55 Kamisar recognized, however, that extending Massiah and Escobedo
52 Id. at 58-59 (footnotes omitted).
" Id. at 59.
54 Id. at 61. For example, the logic of Massiah-which relied upon the constitutional norm
that a conviction could not stand if it rested in part on a confession that "had been deliberately
elicited by the police after the defendant had been indicted, and therefore at a time when he was
clearly entitled to a lawyer's help" and which also recognized "that a Constitution which guarantees a
defendant the aid of counsel at... trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under
interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding", Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204--
easily extended to police interrogation of an arrestee. As Kamisar observed:
Why does the "subject" of police interrogation who has not yet been indicted need
"a lawyer's help" any less than one who has been? If the failure to vouchsafe the aid of
counsel to "an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely
extrajudicial proceeding" "might deny [him] effective representation by counsel at the
only stage when legal aid and advice would help him," how or why is this less true of the
unindicted prisoner?
Kamisar, supra note 9, at 44-45 (footnote omitted); cf Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208 (White, J.,
dissenting) (the reasoning of the majority "would seem equally pertinent to statements obtained at
any time after the right to counsel attaches, whether there has been an indictment or not.").
Similarly, if Escobedo is read broadly, then the "right to counsel" that invalidated Danny
Escobedo's conviction "requires the continued presence and constant advice of counsel once he
enters the picture, the right looms as a much more formidable, if not insurmountable, barrier to
productive interrogation." Kamisar, supra note 9, at 61.
55 See, e.g., Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-89:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modem, that a system of
criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long
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that far was unwarranted. 56 He agreed with "police-prosecution-minded critics of
the Court" that if all interrogation was barred, then the critics could rightly claim
that "the heavens were falling., 57 Yet, while Kamisar recognized that Massiah and
Escobedo should not (and would not) be pushed to their logical extremes, he also
stated that arbitrary limits should not be imposed on the constitutional protections
conferred by these rulings:
I do not deny that radiations from these cases must be modulated,
perhaps, e.g., by applying them no earlier than the time of arrest or at the
point when potentially coercive interrogation situations arise. I do deny
that modulation should be achieved at the expense of the poor and the
ignorant, e.g., by honoring rights only if asserted, but not effectively
advising suspects of them; by heeding requests for the assistance of
counsel only if the suspect can afford to hire a lawyer, but not providing
any at state expense. 58
Second, Kamisar recognized that other constitutional norms besides the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel were at stake in the debate about the impact and
meaning of Massiah and Escobedo. Kamisar urged that, following its shift in
focus from the Due Process Clause to the Sixth Amendment, the Court should
again shift its focus and look to the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. 59  After all, when discussing the limits the
Constitution imposes on police interrogation methods, "[q]uestions about the
nature and scope of the right to counsel spill into questions about the nature and
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. 60 For example, while Escobedo
had been previously advised by his counsel that he should request to speak with his
lawyer if arrested by the police, Escobedo was unprepared to deal with a false
accusation of having been the trigger-man in a murder, and unaware of the legal
significance that admitting to being present at the murder scene was just as
damning as an admission of having fired the fatal shots. Put simply, it was defense
counsel, and not the police, that was best positioned to inform the arrestee of his
Fifth Amendment rights and the significance of talking to the police.
run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.
Id.; Id. at 490 ("If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law
enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.").
56 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 61.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 61-62.
'9 Id. at 62.
60 Id. (footnote omitted). Kamisar observed that "Danny Escobedo only claimed a right to
consult with counsel, not a right to his continued presence during police interrogation. But the
Supreme Court opinion assigned more weight to the privilege against self-incrimination-and may
have given it a more expansive reading, to boot-than did the Escobedo briefs." Id. at 63.
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Finally, Kamisar also recognized that equality norms, articulated in the
Court's Equal Protection Clause cases, were latent in the constitutional debate
concerning police interrogation and confessions. 6' Here, Kamisar tackled one of
the most difficult questions confronting the judiciary and law enforcement
officials-who may invoke the protection afforded by Escobedo-but he made the
tackle look easy:
More than legal symmetry is involved. Can it really be argued that the
"gatehouse" assistance of assigned counsel-but not retained counsel-
would "cripple" police efficiency? Are the "arguments from
necessity"-and that is essentially the case for a police interrogation
"opportunity"-to be overridden when, and only when, a suspect is
sophisticated enough or hardened enough to assert his rights or rich
enough to exercise them?...
The relevant question, however, is not whether the rights conferred by
Escobedo can be confined to a "reasonable" class in the abstract, but
whether such a class excludes persons similarly situated with respect to
the policies and purposes of the decision ....
•.. [H]ow can the lack of wealth or sophistication or experience be
viewed as reasonable differentiations fairly related to the object of these
recent decisions? ... [H]ow can those ignorant of the privilege or the
right to counsel be denied the benefits of th[e] policy resolution [reached
in Escobedo]? .. . [H]ow does the situation become less delicate, less
perilous; why does the need for legal guidance diminish, when the
suspect is poor or ignorant? ... [H]ow can those least aware of their
constitutional rights "reasonably" be placed beyond the case's bounds?..
. [H]ow can poverty, ignorance, stupidity, or friendlessness amount to
exclusionary classifying traits?...
If "the mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-
constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color"-then the
inability of a suspect to retain counsel cannot constitute sufficient
grounds for limiting the impact of Escobedo, however "practical" or
"reasonable" this might seem to some people. If "the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on a request" and, like other
constitutional rights, must be "intelligently and understandingly
61 Id. at 68-69; see also id. at 93 ("In the wake of Escobedo ... the 'equality norm' exerts
pressure to provide all suspects with the rights a Danny Escobedo may enjoy at a time when there is
much confusion over what these rights are and more controversy over what they ought to be.").
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waived,["] then, again, inadequate formal education or insufficient native
intelligence cannot be good enough reasons for failing to bring the right
to counsel into play, however "fair" or "natural" this might seem to some
people.62
After making these observations about the proper way to read Escobedo,
Kamisar approvingly and extensively quoted-because he could not "improve" on
the language it contained63-a government report written for Attorney General
Robert Kennedy:
When government chooses to exercise its powers in the criminal area, its
obligation is surely no less than that of taking reasonable measures to
eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just administration of the law
but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect determinations of the
accused's liability or penalty. While government may not be required to
relieve the accused of his poverty, it may properly be required to
minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of justice.64
Wherever the Court was going with Escobedo, Kamisar predicted that it "will
not get there this year or the next." Rather, "[tihe story of Escobedo and its
progeny may take fifteen or forty years to tell, but the basic plot could well be the
same." 65 While he believed that the final adjudication of the confession "problem"
would take several years, Kamisar had no doubt about the correct interpretation of
Escobedo, despite its "accordion-like" tone. The minimal meaning of Escobedo
and the proper way to read that decision were clear: all arrestees are entitled to the
constitutional protections conferred by Escobedo.66
B. Was Kamisar Right?
Was Kamisar's analysis sound? Did he accurately predict what a post-
Escobedo Court would do? Although Kamisar's sense of timing on "when" the
Court would make a major move in the confession area was off, his legal analysis
62 Id. at 70-73 (footnotes omitted).
63 Id. at 75.
64 Id. at 75-76 (quoting REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (1963)). As Kamisar explained years later,
the Attorney General's Committee was chaired by Professor Francis A. Allen, and the report issued
by the Committee became known as the "Allen Report." See Yale Kamisar, Francis A. Allen:
"Confrontfing] the Most Explosive Problems" and "Plumbing All Issues to Their Full Depth Without
Fear or Prejudice", 85 MICH. L. REv. 406, 407 (1986). It is probably no coincidence that Chief
Justice Warren cites the Allen Report in the same footnote wherein Kamisar's Gatehouses and
Mansions article is cited. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472 n.41.
65 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 91.
66 Id. at 80-81.
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was prescient and exact. Indeed, Kamisar's insight on the next steps the Court
would take was near-perfect. Kamisar's reading of Escobedo was essentially the
way the Miranda Court would read Escobedo.
As "every schoolboy" now knows,67 Miranda ruled that an arrestee must be
told of his right to remain silent and his right to have counsel present during any
police interrogation. As the Court explained, "the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.,
68
The Court's reliance on the Fifth Amendment came as a surprise to some.
Prior to Miranda, the dominant view was that the Fifth Amendment did not control
police interrogation methods. 69 Relying on Massiah and Escobedo, many of the
lawyers representing the defendants in Miranda and its companion cases had
understandably constructed their arguments around the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.7°
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda, however, demonstrated that the
Court had once again shifted its constitutional focus, just as Kamisar urged. As the
Court had done a few years earlier when it "shift[ed] to the image of the
accusatorial, adversary trial as the controlling standard of the coerced confessions
cases," 71 the Miranda Court again altered the constitutional focus for evaluating
police interrogation methods. In his opening paragraph, the Chief Justice stated
that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause would decide the cases
under review.72
Although a shift to the Fifth Amendment may have been unanticipated in
some quarters, Kamisar and others knew that the Fifth Amendment would affect
the Court's future rulings on police interrogation and confessions, since
"[q]uestions about the nature and scope of the right to counsel spill into questions
67 Cf Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 ("Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice
to the point where warnings have become part of our national culture."); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 439 (1974) ("At this point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the
concept, if not the language, [of the privilege against self-incrimination].").
68 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
69 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 25-38.
70 See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 118 n.45
(1998) (citing briefs filed in Miranda and its companion cases); John J. Flynn, Panel Discussion on
the Exclusionary Rule 61 F.R.D. 259, 278 (1972) ("I was introduced for my accomplishments
primarily as being of counsel in Miranda, and consistently I must disabuse everyone of the
accomplishment .... When certiorari was granted [in Miranda] and we were asked by the ACLU to
prepare and file the brief, we had a meeting in our law office in which we agreed that the briefs
should be written with the entire focus on the Sixth Amendment [right to counsel] because that was
where the Court was headed after Escobedo .... "), quoted in MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note 22, at 462.
71 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 46.
72 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
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about the nature and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. 73 Kamisar
also perceived that "the [Escobedo] opinion assigned more weight to the privilege
against self-incrimination-and may have given it a more expansive reading, to
boot-than did the Escobedo briefs. 74 In retrospect, Kamisar and Chief Justice
Warren appear to have been thinking along parallel lines. According to the Chief
Justice, Escobedo's attention to the fact that the police had not, at the outset of the
interrogation, informed Escobedo of his right to remain silent "was no isolated
factor, but an essential ingredient in our decision., 75 The Chief Justice went on to
state:
The entire thrust of police interrogation [in Escobedo], as in all the cases
today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair
his capacity for rational judgment. The abdication of the constitutional
privilege-the choice on his part to speak to the police-was not made
knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his
rights; the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and
not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.76
The Court's shift to the Fifth Amendment had practical and substantive
consequences.77 Under a Fifth Amendment regime, a suspect had a constitutional
right to prevent police interrogation from ever occurring or to terminate
questioning at anytime during the interrogation.78 This principle was significant
because:
Miranda eliminated, at least in principle, the due process test's built-in
conflict between the police officer's duty to obtain a statement and his
duty to respect the suspect's constitutional rights: [T]he Court
emphatically commanded the police to cease all questioning at the first
sign of any desire to remain silent. The conflict, of course, persists
below the surface because the officer will want to obtain a statement, but
at least the Court tried to tell the police what, in theory, was expected of
them.79
73 Karmisar, supra note 9, at 62.
74 Id. at 63.
71 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465.
76 Id.
77 Cf Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 878 (observing that the "crux of Miranda was not so much
the now-famous warnings but rather the Court's holding that" the Fifth Amendment would control
the admissibility of confessions obtained during custodial interrogation).
78 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
'9 Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 879.
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Additionally, Chief Justice Warren recognized that the facts in Miranda and
its companion cases might not have amounted to constitutional violations under the
"voluntariness" standard of the Due Process Clause. 80 None of the cases involved
"overt physical coercion" or even the "patent psychological ploys" that had been
recommended in various police interrogation manuals.8' Although such tactics
might have mattered under a due process analysis, the absence of such evidence
had no bearing when the right protected by the Fifth Amendment was under
review: "[t]he fact remains that in none of the cases did the officers undertake to
afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the
statements were truly the product of free choice.,
82
By abandoning the due process model and shifting to a Fifth Amendment
analysis, the Court was undertaking a deliberate effort to fortify the constitutional
protections afforded suspects during custodial interrogation. 3 When considering
admissibility of a confession under the Due Process Clause, judges were to assess
the totality of the circumstances. A totality analysis requires at least two steps.
First, the judge must assess all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
confession. Second, a judge must weigh or "balance" the government's interest in
obtaining confessions and the suspect's interest in not being coerced. By shifting
to a Fifth Amendment regime, the Court was signaling that the latter type of
"balancing" was no longer appropriate:
go Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 ("In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to
have been involuntary in traditional terms.").
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 120 (1993). Grano explained
that the shift to the Fifth Amendment was "significant from a jurisprudential standpoint":
By thus leaving the due process "totality of circumstances" approach behind, the
Court enabled itself to fashion a detailed code of interrogation rules that due process
jurisprudence could never have supported. Moreover, by shifting constitutional gears
from Fourteenth Amendment due process to Fifth Amendment self-incrimination, the
Court avoided the need formally to overrule decades of due process precedent that had
rejected litmus tests for the admissibility of confessions.
Id. The shift to a Fifth Amendment theory was important for another reason. Prior to Miranda, very
few confessions were "coerced" or "compelled" from a defendant, if coercion or compulsion were
given a literal reading. Put another way, when the Court ruled that a confession was "voluntary" or
"involuntary" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the term "voluntariness"
was "being employed as a term of art, not in its ordinary dictionary sense." Kamisar, supra note 25,
at 746. The difference between what the Due Process Clause barred and what the Fifth Amendment
barred was highlighted during the oral argument in Vignera v. New York, one of the companion cases
to Miranda. Counsel for the defendant was asked by Justice Harlan whether he was claiming that his
client's confession was coerced. Counsel responded: "In no sense. I don't think it was coerced at
all." MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 22, at 460-61. Counsel then explained that:
[i]t is true that the word "compel" is used in the Fifth Amendment with respect to the
privilege, but it is quite different to say that the privilege is cut down and impaired by
detention and to say a man's will has been so overborne a confession is forced from him.
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A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for
interrogation outweighs the privilege . . . . The whole thrust of our
foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed
the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of
government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot
be abridged.84
Second, Kamisar also correctly recognized that rulings under the Equal
Protection Clause would influence the Court's analysis in the confession cases.
One of the questions left unresolved in Escobedo was who may invoke the right to
counsel-only the suspect with retained counsel, or both the suspect with retained
counsel and the suspect too poor or ignorant to hire a lawyer. For Kamisar, the
answer was easy. "[T]he inability of a suspect to retain counsel cannot constitute
sufficient grounds for limiting the impact of Escobedo, however 'practical' or
'reasonable' this might seem to some., 85 Put simply, "the 'equality norm' exerts
pressure to provide all suspects with the rights a Danny Escobedo may enjoy. 86
One year later, the Miranda Court would agree. Indeed, the pressure exerted
by the equality norm on police interrogations, which Kamisar had brilliantly
described,87  became a centerpiece of the constitutional structure built by
84 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (citation omitted); see also Schulhofer, supra note 23:
[Tihe reliance on the Fifth Amendment implied that the need for effective ways of
obtaining statements and the need to avoid overreaching the suspect could no longer be
seen as equally important concerns. Instead, by viewing the problem in Fifth
Amendment terms, the Court made clear (at least in principle) that protection against
compulsory self-incrimination was not to be balanced against other legitimate social
interests.
Id at 878 n.61; cf. Steven J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REv. 941, (2001):
Miranda had brought Fifth Amendment standards into the stationhouse under the
expressly stated assumption that those standards provided more protection than the
traditional Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness requirement. Fifth Amendment
requirements do "sweep more broadly" than those of the Fourteenth, and it was precisely
for that reason that incorporation was, in its day, so controversial.
Id. at 950. Although Miranda chose to rely on the Fifth Amendment rather than the Due Process
Clause, the "due process" model remains the primary test for judging the admissibility of many
incriminating statements obtained after a suspect has waived his Miranda rights or where Miranda's
protection does not apply. See Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 877; Welsh S. White, What is an
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2009 (1998) (arguing that "while police
interrogators [currently] have in some respects been afforded greater freedom than they were during
the era immediately preceding Miranda, the nature of the voluntariness test has not fundamentally
changed").
'5 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 73.
86 Id. at 93.
87 Chief Justice Warren acknowledged Kamisar's contribution and influence on this point.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472 n.41 (citing Kamisar, supra note 9, at 64-81).
[Vol 2:33
IS YALE KAMISAR AS GOOD AS JOE NAMA TH?
Miranda.88 After explaining that every arrestee subject to interrogation must be
informed of his right to remain silent, the negative consequences of speaking to the
police, and his right to consult with counsel prior to and during questioning,
89
Chief Justice Warren made it clear that the rights conferred in Escobedo would not
be limited to the rich or sophisticated suspect or to the person lucky enough to
have retained counsel before arriving at the police station:
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel
before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore
or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or
cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the individual
has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The
privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to
all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege
exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit
these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our
decision today would be of little significance. The cases before us as
well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in
the past involve those unable to retain counsel. While authorities are not
required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the obligation
not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.
Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while
allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more
supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on
appeal struck down in Gideon v. Wainwright and Douglas v.
California.9"
Leaving no doubt that the Court would not tolerate arbitrary distinctions
among suspects, the Chief Justice also instructed police officials to provide an
additional warning that would make the privilege meaningful to the vast majority
of suspects questioned by the police:
88 See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 37, at 1469 ("The Court viewed as unfair a suspect's
inadequacies in confronting his interrogators on an equal basis or in possessing the same fortitude as
other suspects. The Court wanted to place all of the participants on equal ground."); id. at 1470
("Miranda stood out like a crown jewel. It spoke to the disadvantaged and the discontented.").
Caplan argues, however, that this aspect of Miranda is a major flaw of the decision:
[G]uilt is personal .... To hold otherwise is to confuse justice with equality .... Since
sophisticated suspects ordinarily will choose not to confess (with or without knowledge
of their rights), "[t]o strive for equality ... is to strive to eliminate confessions." Thus,
the Miranda Court elected to let one person get away with murder because of the
advantage possessed by another.
Id. at 1457 (footnotes omitted).
89 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465-71.
90 Id. at 472 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his
rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he
has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional
warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often
be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he
has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel
would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the
indigent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the
knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the
warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel,
only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can
there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it. 9'
In retrospect, Kamisar's analysis of Escobedo was amazingly accurate. After
Escobedo was handed down, many people had worried (or hoped) that the ruling
portended that the Court would soon bar all police interrogation. As Kamisar
intuitively knew, such a momentous event was highly unlikely, even though
aspects of Escobedo and Massiah suggested that the Court was taking an
increasingly hostile view of police interrogation. Furthermore, Kamisar also
realized-based on his interpretation of Escobedo and the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence-that the Court would look to constitutional provisions other than
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to resolve the crucial questions raised by Escobedo. As
Kamisar predicted, the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause directly, and
the Equal Protection Clause indirectly, affected the Court's thinking concerning
"who" was entitled to assert the rights conferred by Escobedo and Massiah.
Ultimately, the Court reached the same conclusion that Kamisar and others had
urged: all arrestees-not just the suspect with retained counsel or rich enough to
hire a lawyer, or even the accused sophisticated enough to request a lawyer, but the
poor and ignorant suspect as well-were constitutionally entitled to claim the
protection afforded by the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial
interrogation.
II. DID THE MIRANDA COURT Go FAR ENOUGH?
Among the public at large, the response to Miranda was immediate and
shocking. Predictably, the police reacted most vehemently. To say that the
Court's scrutiny of routine interrogation practices "did not sit well with the law
91 Id. at 473 (footnotes omitted).
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enforcement community ' 92 is an understatement. Indeed, "police looked at
Miranda and felt a 'slap at policemen everywhere ... a personal rebuke."'
93
Ironically, the initial venom that was directed at Miranda and the Warren
Court was misplaced and ill-informed. Although the public may not have
recognized the nature and scope of Miranda in 1966, Kamisar and others knew that
Miranda was a compromise ruling.94 From a civil liberties perspective, Miranda
had several obvious flaws, one of which was the failure to require that
interrogation sessions be recorded in their entirety.
A. Why Not Tape Interrogations?
Prior to Escobedo and Miranda, many police officials (and their defenders)
resisted the assertion that suspects assumed that the police had a legal right to
demand answers to questions during custodial interrogation, and rejected the
charge that, during interrogation sessions, police officers convey the message that
interrogators have unlimited time to obtain the answers they are seeking and
92 LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 176 (1983).
93 Id. at 177.
94 Yale Kamisar, Kauper 's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Later-Some
Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15 (1975):
[A]ithough one would gain little inkling of it from the hue and cry that greeted that much-
maligned case... Miranda marked a 'compromise' between the old 'voluntariness' test
(and the objectionable police interrogation tactics it permitted in fact) and the extreme
proposals that-as the fear (or hope) was expressed at the time-would have 'killed'
confessions.
Id. at 30. Many scholars and judges have recognized that Miranda was a "compromise" decision.
See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516,
526 (1976) ("Nobody, 'liberal' or 'conservative,' is happy with Miranda v. Arizona. Nobody should
be. It is at best a tense, temporary, ragged truce between combatants."); Lawrence Herman, The
Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 733, 736 (1987); Remembering the "Old World", supra note 24, at 578-80; Susan R. Klein,
Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 424 (1994); Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 879-84 (insightful discussion on
the benefits and failures of Miranda to protect Fifth Amendment rights); Weisselberg, supra note 70,
at 121; cf DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 57 (2003) ("[A]s a matter of Sixth Amendment
law, Miranda marked a major victory for the government. Police interrogation was saved from the
jaws of Escobedo."). Although he is extremely skeptical about the merits of the Court's decision in
Miranda, Professor H. Richard Uviller also acknowledges that Miranda neither favors the police nor
arrestees. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 196 (1988):
[T]he resolution of the Miranda case seriously impugns the integrity of its premises: if a
confession given in police custody is necessarily coerced, so is a waiver .... [I]f
noncoercive custodial interrogation is to be permitted (as it is), the famous warning adds
little to the suspect's protection. Those suspects actually intimidated by the
circumstances of custody are hardly reassured by hearing the ritual incantation from their
inquisitors.
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various methods, legal as well as extralegal, for securing those answers. If the
critics of Escobedo were correct about these matters, Kamisar wondered:
[W]hy are the police so bent on preventing counsel from telling them
what they already know? Why, at least, don't the officers themselves tell
their "subjects" plainly and emphatically that they need not and cannot
be made to answer? That they will be permitted to consult with counsel
or be brought before a magistrate in short order? And why is the
"subject" questioned in secret?95
Kamisar recognized, one year before Miranda, that whatever the scope of the
rights conferred by Escobedo, those rights would amount to very little unless
interrogations were recorded. "In the long run, no statute, court rule, or court
decision pertaining to warnings or waivers will suffice-for the same reason that
the flood of appellate opinions on 'involuntary' confessions have not sufficed-
until police interrogation is stripped of its 'most unique feature . its
characteristic secrecy. ,,,
96
Indeed, Kamisar further asserted that unless recording of interrogations was
mandatory, police officers would be able to "shrug off' any constitutional rule
imposed by the Court knowing that enforcement of that any such rule would
97depend on their testimony. If recording was not required, Kamisar opined that a
suspect's access to a lawyer was imperative.
98
Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Miranda recognized the problem of
secrecy, but from a different perspective. He noted that the "difficulty in depicting
what transpires at . . . interrogations stems from the fact that in this country they
have largely taken place incommunicado."99 And because police officials are
responsible for establishing and maintaining the secrecy surrounding
interrogations, the Chief Justice imposed a "heavy burden" on the state to prove
that a suspect had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment
rights.100 Yet, the Chief Justice did not follow the advice of Kamisar and others,
despite their compelling constitutional and practical arguments in support of
mandatory recording. Under the framework established in Miranda, where
95 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 32.
96 Id. at 85-86 (quoting Bernard Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A
Skeptical View, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM at 179 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962)).
97 Id. at 87 (footnote omitted).
98 Id.
'9 384 U.S. at 445; id. at 448 ("Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in
secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the
interrogation rooms.").
100 Id. at 475.
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constitutional rights turn on what the police say (or don't say) and the responses of
the arrestee, recording would seem to be a constitutional necessity.'0 '
Why didn't Miranda require recording? Although Chief Justice Warren's
opinion acknowledges the problem of secrecy and the responsibility of the state
"for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes
place," 0 2 it does not mention, let alone require, recording as a tool for capturing
what transpires during interrogation or for reducing some of the abuses of custodial
interrogation. Perhaps the Miranda majority felt that a recording requirement
would exacerbate charges that the Court was "legislating from the bench" with no
constitutional text to support the requirement. 0 3 A judicially imposed recording
requirement might have been perceived as enhancing the "rigidity" of the
opinion.1 4 Or, the Court might have assumed that virtually every suspect, after
receiving the "warnings," would instinctively request counsel, thereby negating the
need for recording because "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances."'
10 5
Whatever the reason, the Court missed and continues to ignore a significant
opportunity to protect the Fifth Amendment's privilege. In 1965, Kamisar knew
that recording was essential if judges were serious about restricting police abuse
during interrogation. More than a decade later, Kamisar, again, convincingly
argued that recording of interrogations "should dominate our thinking about the
confession problem": 
1 06
101 Bernard Weisberg has succinctly stated this point better than anyone else:
It is secrecy, not privacy, which accounts for the absence of a reliable record of
interrogation proceedings in a police station. If the need for some pre-judicial
questioning is assumed, privacy may be defended on grounds of necessity; secrecy
cannot be defended on this or any other ground.
Weisberg, supra note 96, at 155; see also Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 309, 317-21 (2003) (outlining constitutional arguments for a recording requirement). While most
criminal procedure scholars favor an electronic recording requirement, this view has not been
unanimous. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Assessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REv. 387, 486-97 (1996) (proposing videotaping of confessions as an alternative to the provision of
Miranda warnings).
02 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
103 See Yale Kamisar, Killing Miranda In Baltimore: Reflections on David Simon's Homicide,
Jurist: Books-on-Law, Feb. 1999, vol. 2, no. 2 (book review), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
lawbooks/revfeb99.htm (observing that the Miranda Court might have "feared that requiring
electronic recording of police questioning, whenever feasible, would have added fuel to the criticism
that it was 'legislating').
104 Cf BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 590 (1983) (describing Justice Brennan's fear, voiced after reading a draft of
the Chief Justice's opinion, that the Miranda opinion "was too rigid because it failed to leave room
for legislatures to devise alternative procedures for safeguarding the Fifth Amendment privilege").
'0' Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
106 A Hard Look, supra note 22, at 243; id. at 237-43 (providing arguments supporting a
recording requirement).
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Otherwise, decades of experience will surely have been wasted.
Otherwise, it will be of no great moment whether new stories are added
to the temples of constitutional law or old ones removed. For any time
an officer unimpeded by any objective record distorts, misinterprets, or
overlooks one or more critical events, the temple may fall. For it will be
a house built upon sand.'
0 7
Regrettably, thirty-four years after Kamisar initially pressed the point, little
has changed. Despite the virtually unanimous view of criminal procedure scholars,
and supporters and critics of Miranda alike, that interrogations should be recorded,
electronic recording of interrogations remains the rare exception in the nation's
police stations.' 0 8 By 1999, Kamisar was using even stronger language to reiterate
what he had proposed on the eve of Miranda:
The only startling thing about [mandatory recording] is that, after all
these years, American law enforcement officials are still able to prevent
objective recordation of all the facts of police "interviews" or
"conversations" with a suspect and, of course, how the warnings are
delivered and how the waiver of rights is obtained .... Unless tape-
recording of police interrogations is required, it will be of no great
moment whether Miranda is expanded or cut down or reshaped. For
absent such a requirement, sweet-talking police interrogators will be able
to assail, maim, and all but kill Miranda (or, for that matter, any other
confession rule).'0 9
The failure to require recording of interrogations is a major flaw of Miranda.
Without an objective recording of what occurred during an interrogation session,
trial judges are forced to resolve the "swearing contest" between the arrestee who
insists that his rights were violated and the police who claim that they scrupulously
respected the arrestee's rights."10 It is no surprise that trial judges typically rule in
favor of the police because, as Walter Schaefer acknowledged ten years before
Miranda was decided:
'07 Id. at 243.
108 See Slobogin, supra note 101, at 314. Illinois recently enacted legislation mandating
recording of interrogation of homicide suspects only. Monica Davey, Illinois Will Require Taping of
Homicide Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at A12.
109 Kamisar, supra note 103.
"o See William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REv. 975, 976 n.8 (2001) (noting
that Miranda "did nothing to ensure an objective record of the interrogation, leaving suppression
hearings in the same situation-swearing matches between suspects and police officers-they were
in before Miranda was decided.").
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[i]n the field of criminal procedure . .. a strong local interest competes
only against an ideal. Local interest is concerned with the particular case
and with the guilt or innocence of the particular individual . . . . The
counterbalance is only a general ideal of fair procedure which, if it is to
prevail, must transcend the circumstances of the particular case. 1 '
And because appellate judges tend to defer to the factual findings of trial
judges, the judiciary inevitably credits the "police" version of what was said or
done during an interrogation session. Police officers are surely aware of this
reality." 12 Thus, without an objective record of the interrogation sessions, the
constitutional protections afforded by Miranda are left to the discretion and good
faith of police officers.
B. Access to Lawyers, the Fifth Amendment, and Kamisar
Another major defect (or one of the few virtues, depending on your
perspective) of Miranda was the failure to require that a suspect be given access to
counsel. From the perspective of the typical suspect-the poor, ignorant or
minority arrestee-access to counsel was essential to make the Fifth Amendment's
privilege meaningful. After all:
[I]t is a prime function of police custodial incommunicado interrogation
to tear a subject away from all things on which he can rely for support
and place him in complete subservience to the interrogator. The aim is
to have him dominated by the interrogator. In order to dispel such
circumstances, therefore, it is manifestly necessary that the
incommunicado environment be eliminated. The presence of counsel
will tend to accomplish this aim." 3
If the Fifth Amendment is to have real meaning in the interrogation context,
then the "aim" of the Court must be "to assure that the individual's right to choose
111 Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5
(1956). When he wrote this article, Schaefer was a Justice on the Illinois Supreme Court. Tellingly,
Justice Schaefer acknowledged the difficulty he experiences when deciding constitutional issues. "I
can testify that it is not always easy to focus upon the [constitutional] procedural requirement and
shut out considerations of guilt or innocence." Id. at 13.
112 Cf Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Those who use third-degree tactics
and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and
waivers."); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REv. 349, 350 (1974) ("I am convinced that the major force shaping the evolution of Supreme Court
confession cases from Brown v. Mississippi through Haynes and Escobedo to Miranda was distrust of
the fact-finding propensities of state trial judges.").
113 Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 23, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) [hereinafter Brief of ACLU].
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between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation
process."' 14 When approached from this perspective, "the right to have counsel
present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege .... ,
Although the argument supporting mandatory access to counsel made good
sense from a Fifth Amendment perspective, the Court's pre-Miranda doctrine, as
Kamisar cogently explained, had created much confusion regarding the scope and
duration of the right to counsel for arrestees. From one viewpoint, the right to
counsel recognized in Escobedo could be seen as a narrow protection for arrestees
because "Danny Escobedo only claimed a right to consult with counsel, not a right
to his continued presence during police interrogation."'' 
6
A broader view of the right conferred in Escobedo, however, was also
possible. The result in Massiah, another right to counsel case, "seem[ed] to
prohibit any interrogation of a person without his lawyer's consent or presence
once he is formally charged."' 17 As the dissenters in Massiah pointed out, "'the
reason given for the result here-the admissions were obtained in the absence of
counsel-would seem equally pertinent to statements obtained at any time after the
right to counsel attaches, whether there has been an indictment or not."' ' 18 Indeed,
many feared that Escobedo seemed to embrace the very point made by the Massiah
dissenters when Justice Goldberg wrote "no meaningful distinction [regarding the
right to counsel] can be drawn between interrogation of an accused before and
after formal indictment."'"19 In sum, "if the 'right to counsel' requires the
continued presence and constant advice of counsel once he enters the picture, the
right looms as a much more formidable, if not insurmountable, barrier to
productive interrogation."'' 20  Put another way, access to counsel will make an
arrestee's Fifth Amendment privilege meaningful.
In Miranda and its companion cases, the issue of mandatory access to counsel
was clearly on the minds of some of the Justices. 121 Indeed, the amicus brief filed
by the American Civil Liberties Union argued that the presence of counsel during
interrogation was required under the Fifth Amendment. 122 Ultimately, however,
114 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
115 Id.
116 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 63.
117 Id. at 64.
118 Id. (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206 (White, J., dissenting)).
19 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486.
120 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 61.
121 See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 68 n.47.
122 Brief of ACLU, supra note 113, at 3 ("A police warning of the subject's right to remain
silent is not adequate. Neither is the granting of prior access to counsel, as distinguished from the
presence of counsel."); id. at 23:
[T]here is a need to provide the presence of someone at interrogation in whom the subject
can confide and who will bolster his confidence .... The aim of [interrogation] is to
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Chief Justice Warren's opinion bypassed the issue of whether the Fifth
Amendment required that all arrestees have access to counsel. As Professor
Stephen Schulhofer has noted, the Court "could have done much better by insisting
on the presence of an attorney during interrogation, or by requiring initial
consultation with an attorney or friend, or even by mandating that warnings and
waivers take place in the presence of a neutral magistrate who could break the wall
of isolation and hostility surrounding the suspect."' 123 Interestingly, in several
places, Chief Justice Warren's opinion acknowledged the merits of the ACLU
position, 124 but he failed to directly address the ACLU argument. 
25
Kamisar's own views on this subject in Gatehouses and Mansions are not
entirely clear, which is very un-Kamisaresque. On the one hand, Kamisar states
have [the subject] dominated by the interrogator. In order to dispel such circumstances,
therefore, it is manifestly necessary that the incommunicado environment be eliminated.
The presence of counsel will tend to accomplish this aim.
Id.
123 Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 881 (footnotes omitted).
124 For example, after discussing Escobedo and the fact that Escobedo's request for counsel
was denied, the Court observed:
The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be the adequate
protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the
dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure that statements made in the
government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466. Later, the Court noted that:
[E]ven preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly
overcome by the secret interrogation process. Thus, the need for counsel to protect the
Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior
to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant
so desires.
Id. at 470.
125 One passage in Miranda suggested a summary rejection of the ACLU position. That
section stated: "This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a
'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners." 384 U.S. at 474. Shortly after
Miranda was decided, Kamisar took the view that Miranda had not directly addressed the ACLU
position. See Kamisar, supra note 8, at 68 n.47 ("The failure of the Court to deal explicitly with (if
only to reject) the ACLU contention is surprising ...."). As the years have passed, Kamisar's
thinking on this point appears to have evolved. In 1990, he wrote: "Although the [Miranda] Court
must have considered [the ACLU] contention-it was heavily influenced by other portions of the
ACLU brief-it rejected it without any explicit discussion." Remembering the "Old World", supra
note 24, at 583 n.158. For what is it worth, the Rehnquist Court seems to agree with Kamisar's
updated view that Miranda did reject the ACLU position. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986):
Declining to adopt the more extreme position that the actual presence of a lawyer
was necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation, see Brief for
American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae. . . ,the [Miranda] Court found that
the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less intrusive
means.
Id. at 426.
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that he "would not abolish all in-custody police interrogation," and he recognizes
that the state does not have "an obligation to prevent a suspect from incriminating
himself.'' 126 Moreover, he disagrees that the logic of Massiah and Escobedo
impelled that "all police interrogation in the absence of counsel is barred.' 27
Indeed, Kamisar never rejects the conventional wisdom that if counsel is brought
to the stationhouse, all interrogation will cease because "any lawyer worth his salt
will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances." 128
On the other hand, there are times when Kamisar's analysis supports
mandatory access to counsel. For example, after recognizing that it is unrealistic
to expect police to dutifully notify a suspect of the very rights that can then be used
to frustrate an interrogation, 129 Kamisar observed:
Suspects there are who feel in a "pleading guilty" mood, for some of the
many reasons most defendants do plead guilty. Suspects there are who
would intentionally relinquish their rights for some hoped-for favor from
the state. I do not deny this. I do deny that such suspects do not need a
lawyer.
Surely the man who, in effect, is pleading guilty in the gatehouse needs a
lawyer no less than one who arrives at the same decision only after
surviving the perilous journey through that structure.130
Similarly, Kamisar acknowledges the complaint that the presence of counsel
in the police station may result in the suppression of truth, "just as the presence of
counsel at the trial may, when a client is advised not to take the stand, or when an
objection is made to the admissibility of trustworthy, but illegally seized, 'real
evidence."",13' But Kamisar wonders why this matters under the Fifth Amendment:
If the subject of police interrogation not only cannot be "coerced" into
making a statement, but need not volunteer one, why shouldn't he be so
advised? And why shouldn't court-appointed counsel, as well as
retained counsel, so advise him?...
Is there any doubt that the State must provide counsel so that an indigent
may exclude the illegally seized, but trustworthy, physical evidence-
126 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 10.
127 Id. at 61.
Watts, 338 U.S. at 59 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
129 Kamisar, supra note 9, at 35-36.
130 Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
131 Id. at 78.
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may suppress the truth, if you will? Is there any doubt that the failure of
assigned counsel to exclude such probative evidence may amount to
denial of an indigent's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel? To this extent are we not affording the poor an equal
opportunity to avoid a "just conviction"? Why shouldn't the same be
done in the case of the privilege against self-incrimination?
13 2
Finally, if the Court is unwilling to require that interrogations be
electronically recorded, Kamisar observes that the need for counsel's presence at
the stationhouse is even more compelling:
How can we indefinitely postpone the electronic preservation of speech
in circumstances where-not just from the point when the subject is
ready to confess, but from the very start of the proceedings to the
finish-who said exactly what, precisely how, is so important? Until that
day comes, the case for the continued presence (if not the constant
advice) of counsel will grow ever stronger. Until that day comes, too
many police interrogators will be able to shrug off the new right-to-
counsel confession cases as they have the old, with the comforting
thought that "after all prohibition is better than no liquor at all."' 133
Chief Justice Warren refused to impose a rule mandating access to counsel
because Miranda was a "compromise" decision. If the Court was unwilling to
impose the less burdensome requirement of mandatory recording of interrogation
sessions, mandatory access to a lawyer before interrogation was a chimera. But
why was Kamisar unwilling to advocate a rule requiring mandatory access to
counsel before interrogation of any arrestee? And why has Kamisar been
noticeably mild in his criticism of Miranda on this issue? 134 For example, shortly
after Miranda was decided Kamisar noted that "[tihe Miranda Court required
enough things 'at one gulp,' for me at any rate, but a rule that a suspect needs
counsel to waive counsel is by no means unthinkable." '35
132 Id. at 78-79 (footnote omitted).
"' Id. at 87-88 (footnotes omitted).
134 Cf Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 882 ("Kamisar probably would be the last person to deny
[Miranda's] shortcomings. Yet his [first post-Miranda article] seems astonishingly circumspect
about these matters.").
135 Kamisar, supra note 8, at 68 n.47. A decade later, Kamisar observed:
Miranda has weaknesses. The principal cluster of its weaknesses (from the
suspect's perspective, at any rate) is that it permits the police to obtain waivers of
constitutional rights without the advice or presence of counsel, without the advice or
presence of a judicial officer, and without any objective recording of the proceedings.
But these weaknesses... are not irremediable.
When Does it Matter?, supra note 22, at 100.
2004]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
Kamisar's muted criticisms of Miranda are not surprising. Kamisar's
scholarship is the rare combination of compelling and persuasive legal analysis
with the proper amount of realpolitik. I suspect that Gatehouses and Mansions did
not urge a mandatory access to counsel rule because Kamisar knew that such a rule
was unobtainable, notwithstanding the forceful legal arguments favoring such a
rule-many of which Kamisar himself had formulated and articulated. 13 6 Put
simply, Kamisar realized that the Court would only go so far in Miranda. Years
later, Kamisar made the point more directly:
[L]iberal critics of Miranda do not seem to realize that if, for example,
[the Court had required that a suspect meet with and obtain the advice of
counsel before effectively waiving his rights, or] the Court had explicitly
required the police to make a tape recording, or even a verbatim
stenographic record, of the crucial events, it would have received a great
deal more criticism than it actually did (and it received quite a bit) for
acting not as a court but as a legislature.
Moreover, and more generally, the liberal critics of Miranda do not seem
to realize that in 1966 it was probably not possible to persuade a majority
of the Court to go one inch further than it did.
137
III. CONCLUSION
Miranda is no longer considered the "monster" that police officials and
political conservatives claimed it was in 1966. "Most professional law
enforcement organizations ha[ve] learned to live with Miranda, and even to love it,
to the extent that it provide[s] them with a safe harbor."' 138 Indeed, there are good
reasons to believe that the Miranda "warnings work to liberate the police" and that
136 After Miranda was decided, Kamisar generously noted "in all ... respects the ACLU
amicus brief presents 'a conceptual, legal and structural formulation that is practically identical to the
majority opinion-even as to use of language in various passages of the opinion."' Kamisar, supra
note 8, at 68 n.47 (citation omitted). Modestly, and understandably, Kamisar did not say that the
ACLU brief relies heavily on the legal analysis and arguments presented in his Gatehouses and
Mansions article.
137 Yale Kamisar, Miranda Does Not Look So Awesome Now, LEGAL TIMES, June 10, 1996, at
22.
138 CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 45 (1991); cf Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (noting that Miranda "strikes
the proper balance between society's legitimate law enforcement interests and the protection of the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights"). In his new and insightful book, Professor Dripps attributes
Miranda's survival and "promising life expectancy," in part, to another of Kamisar's articles. Dripps
notes that Kamisar's The Miranda Dissents, see supra note 8, thoroughly destroyed the doctrinal
arguments of those who advocated that the voluntariness test of the Due Process Clause was better
suited to resolve the constitutional issues surrounding police interrogation and confessions. DRIPPS,
supra note 94, at 83-84.
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"Miranda's warnings unquestionably serve-and from the outset were designed to
serve-the function of permitting custodial interrogation to continue.' 39 Miranda
is no longer a "monster" in the eyes of the police (and the modem Supreme Court)
because Miranda is no longer what it was. Although Dickerson v. United States
140
purported to reaffirm Miranda's constitutional status, what Dickerson actually
reaffirmed "was not the robust Miranda that burst on the scene in 1966, but the
Miranda that was bloodied and bruised by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in the
subsequent years."' 41 And as Kamisar demonstrates in his most recent article on
Miranda, the so-called "conservative" majority on the Rehnquist Court "is
unwilling to take Miranda very seriously."'
' 42
Notwithstanding these practical realities, some judges and legal scholars insist
that Miranda was (and remains) an illegitimate ruling. For example, Justice Scalia
has asserted that:
Miranda was objectionable for innumerable reasons, not least the fact
that cases spanning more than seventy years had rejected its core premise
that, absent the warnings and an effective waiver of the right to remain
silent and of the (thitherto unknown) right to have an attorney present, a
statement obtained pursuant to custodial interrogation was necessarily
the product of compulsion. 4
3
Justice Scalia has also opined that "what is most remarkable about the
Miranda decision-and what made it unacceptable as a matter of straightforward
constitutional interpretation in the Marbury'44 tradition--is its palpable hostility
toward the act of confession per se, rather than toward what the Constitution
abhors, compelled confession.' 45 In a similar vein, the late Joe Grano wrote that
"the rights that Miranda created were unprecedented in federal constitutional
law,"'146 and Professor Gerald Caplan has complained that "with one stroke, the
[Miranda] Court boldly and improperly resolved the contradictions in the law of
confessions by giving it a single focus-the protection of the suspect."1
47
139 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 436 (1987).
140 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
'4' Yale Kamisar, A Look Back on a Half-Century of Teaching, Writing and Speaking About
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure, 2 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 69, 88 (2004).
142 Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda "Poisoned
Fruit" Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. C~iM. L. 97, 114 (2004). The conservative majority are: Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
"43 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 448 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
144 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
146 GRANO, supra note 83, at 120.
147 Caplan, supra note 37, at 1469 (footnote omitted).
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These complaints are wide of the mark.148 Gatehouses and Mansions plainly
demonstrates that Miranda did not come out of nowhere. More importantly,
Kamisar's article establishes that the legal principles that justified the result in
Miranda were securely anchored in constitutional law. A complete reading of
Gatehouses and Mansions provides a powerful counterweight to critics who charge
that Miranda is an illegitimate constitutional ruling. Unfortunately, many law
students (and probably a few law professors) will only read the redacted version of
Gatehouses and Mansions.149  True, the redacted version contains Kamisar's
brilliant metaphors and compelling writing about the "de facto inquisitorial system
which has characterized our criminal procedure for so long." 150 But the redacted
article does not provide the reader with Kamisar's analysis of Escobedo, nor does
the redacted article contain Kamisar's development of the "equality norm" that
was a crucial component of the constitutional analysis that supports Miranda.
151
Only by reading the entire article is one exposed to Kamisar's vision and
knowledge about constitutional law.
Having read Gatehouses and Mansions several times, I now believe that the
best parts of the article--"the straightforward constitutional [parts] in the Marbury
tradition"152-are omitted from the version that most law students and members of
the legal profession will read. That is too bad, because without having read those
sections of Kamisar's essay, one can never fully appreciate the wisdom and
constitutional legitimacy of Miranda. It is like watching the last three minutes of
Super Bowl III without having known about Broadway Joe's pre-game
''guarantee."
148 For replies to these criticisms of Miranda, see Thirty-Five Years Later, supra note 24 (reply
to Justice Scalia's dissent in Dickerson); Thomas, supra note 36 (critique of Grano's book); Welsh S.
White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1986) (responding to
Professor Caplan).
149 See MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 22, at 432-36; POLICE INTERROGATION,
supra note 26, at 27-40.
15o POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 26, at 32.
'51 At her Senate confirmation hearings, Justice Ginsburg recognized and supported this aspect
of Miranda. -[Miranda warnings provide] an assurance that people know their rights. It is an
assurance that the law is going to be administered even-handedly because, as I said, sophisticated
defendants who have counsel ordinarily will know about their rights."' Kamisar, supra note 10, at 8
(quoting The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Hearings on S. 103-482 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 327 (1993)).
152 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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